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IMMOVABLE LAWS, IRRESISTIBLE RIGHTS: NATURAL LAW.
MORAL RIGf--iTS, AND FEMINIST ETHICS
By Christine Pierce, University Press of Kansas, 200 I

Reviewed by Rebecca Whisnant
University of Southern Illinois

This collection of Pierce's essays traces the evolution of her thinking
about nClturClI law theory-Clnd, more broadly, about talk of "natures" as
110rlllCltively significant--over a period of 30 years. We see her move
from a wholesale rejection of such tCllk, in her influential 1971 piece
"Natural Law Language and Women," to a qualified admission that it can
have its liberatory uses. Yet she maintains throughout that, progressive
potential 01' no, natural law is far inferior to Kantian notions of rights and
Clutonomy as a fOlindMion for ethical thought.
Pierce's early argument in "Natural Law Language and Women,"
revised and updated for this collection, stands out for its clarity and force.
Its influence on later commentators such as Richard Mohr is plain ; that its
core argument is by now familiar does not detract from its importance for
any attempt to ground morCllity in conceptions of the "natural." As Pierce
shows, there is no automatic positive value attached to what is natural,
except when "natural" is used teleologically to describe something's
function or purpose. But in that case, she argues, the positive valence is
not necessarily moral: a good bomb is· one that performs well its function
of destruction, but knowing this tells us nothing about when (if ever) it is
morally good for that function to be performed.
In her essays on gay marriage, AIDS, homosexual sex, and women's
roles, Pierce shows that natural-law-based arguments still make regular
Clppenrances in COUlt cases and elsewhere in public discourse. Those who
believe that the charge of "unnaturalness" functions more often as a tool
of oppressive social control than as a substantive moral criticism will find
plenty of fodder here.
Her most philosophically compelling argument against natural law
theory, however, is outlined in Chapter 3 ("NaturCIl Law and Moral
Rights"). Responding to Alan Donagan's attempt to incorporate elements
of traditional naturClI law within a Kantian frame'vvork, she argues con-
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vincingly that any such attempt is doomed to failure . She outlines several ways in which the core of Kantian moral theory is irreconcilable with
that of trad itional natural law theory. Most fundamentally, natural law
theory is incompatible with " Kant's fundamental insight about the nature
and worth of persons"-namely, that they are ends in themselves, possessors of autonomy, and sources of law.
As she recognizes, this is most clearly true of the Thomist tradition
of natural law thinking, with its emphasis on the "great chain of being"
in wh ich each class has the natural function of serving the c lass above it
in the chain . As Pierce points out, such a view clearly licenses treating
some classes of persons as mere means to others' ends. Granted, we
could rescue the account from some of its most egregious implications
by granting that all persons belong to the same class (so that women, for
instance, are not deemed the natural servants of men). Even so, the
metaphysical (and hence moral) damage is done-persons , like other
beings, are here seen essentially as means (to God ' s ends, presumably)
rather than as ends in themselves. Relatedly, Pierce charges, the natural
law tradition casts the virtue of persons in the same mold as that of
objects; a good person is one who fu lfils well the function of persons, just
like a good car fulfils well the function of cars. There is no sharp dividing line here between persons and things; hence, it is not surprising that
the view licenses (indeed, it seems, requires) treating persons as mere
means. Pierce concludes that "the Kantian doctrine of moral personhood
should lead us to a rejection of the natural law tradition of Aquinas and
Aristotle."
Pierce usefully contrasts this tradition of thought about "natural functions" with Plato's competing account. In Plato's version, there are no
separate functions for different classes of people; rather the function of
human beings in general is reason, and the function of each is to do what
he or she is good at. The wisest and most able persons, then, fu lfi II their
functions by leading and guiding; superiority here yields responsibility
rather than entitlement to others' service. In these respects, as Pierce
says, Plato's account is far more attractive than that of Aristotle and
Aquinas. Regrettably, however, she says little about the extent to which
her criticisms of natural law theory apply to Plato's account (or to suitably updated versions of it). Granted, as she notes, the Thomist version
has had far greater historical influence; nonetheless, there is surely tbeo-
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retical interest in whether and how this historically significant competing
version of "natural function" talk in moral discourse can be reconciled
with modern conceptions of autonomy and rights.
Pierce does observe that, even on Plato's account, individual choice
about one's roles and activities must take a back seat to performing one's
proper function. While this restriction of personal autonomy is unlikely
to appeal to contemporary liberals, it seems qualitatively different from
that required by Aristotle's view, since here one's function is at least
defined according to one's individual qualities and abilities. Neither is it
clear, to me at least, that Plato's view licenses treating some persons as
mere means to others' ends.
In any case, Pierce's comparison of these two ancient versions of natural-function talk sets the stage for further discussion-by Pierce or others-of whether Plato's view runs afoul of core Kantian norms in the
same ways that the Aristotelian/Tholllist tradition does. Her arguments in
this chapter, of course, are to some degree preaching to the choir, since
they are unlikely to convert any natural law proponents who are not
already at least proto-Kantians. But in showing that we cannot have it
both ways-that, again, synthesizing efforts such as Donegan's are misguided-Pierce nonetheless makes a significant contribution.
In the final chapter ("Natural Law Today"), Pierce assesses several
contemporary attempts to rehabilitate natural law theory. After convincingly criticizing Cristina Traina's attempted integration of natural law
with feminist philosophy, she turns her attention to two very different
authors who base substantive ethical conclusions on observations of the
natural world: sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson and biologist Bruce
Bagem ih I.
Pierce's discussion of Wilson's attempt (in his COl7silience) to shift
ethics toward "a science-based material analysis" shows clearly that her
own points in "Natural Law Language and Women" still need reiterating
th irty years later. Wi Ison contends that by using empirical methods to
discover the biological forces that predispose us to make certain kinds of
choices, we can reveal a new kind of foundation for ethics. He himself
grants, however, that there are some "natural" human drives and preferences that we should follow and encourage, and others we should suppress. As Pierce points out, it is not at all clear how empirical methods
are to help us distinguish between the two. She locates an illuminating
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example in Wilson's contention that men's attraction to heavily made-up
women is a result of male animals' natural preference for "supernormal
stimuli," that is, for images of females whose physical features are exaggerated (ironically enough) beyond those typically found in nature.
Wilson contends that "the entire beauty industry can be interpreted as the
manufacture of supernormal stimuli"; the clear implication is that the
industry is therefore natural, inevitable, and beyond criticism. Pierce
responds by rem inding us of the many ways in which the beauty industry
harms, shames, and constrains women in order to conform them physically to male expectations-showing once again that a preference's "naturalness" does not exclusively establish its moral credentials.
Pierce's discussion ofBagemihl's Biological Exuberance exemplifies
another of the book's recurring themes: the use of "nature" to support liberal or radical moral positions rather than conservative ones. Although
Bagemihl is not a philosopher, his observations of widespread homosexual behavior and orientation among nonhuman animals is clearly meant
to debunk the centuries-old claim that homosexual ity is morally wrong
because unnatural. Bagemihl suggests that, on the contrary (in Pierce's
words), "homosexuality, transgender, and nonreproductive heterosexuality are all part of biological diversity, which is intrinsically valuable."
Pierce is suitably restrained in her assessment of the moral impoli of
Bagemihl's work. "Even though there is no logical entailment between
'what is' and 'what ought to be'," she says, "there is generally an impact
on people's lives and attitudes that comes from knowing what seem to be
the facts." For instance, accounts like Bagemihl's may assuage gay people's experience of "loneliness in the universe ... feeling like an aberration in nature." A realistic perception of facts about the natural world
(including humans as biological organisms) can thus aid our reflection
about our place within larger systems, comforting and challenging us in
turn. While Pierce's comments on this phenomenon are suggestive, I
would have liked to hear more about how, if at all, "nature" bears on oLlr
actual moral obligations and entitlements. Granted, nature does not generate immutable moral Jaws based on the natural kind to which one
belongs; nor does it provide a foundation for ethics. But in what ways (if
any) does it shed light on what we ought to do, or on what counts as a
morally admirable human life? Are facts about nature and our place in it
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morally significant in ways that go beyond their effects on our beliefs and
attitudes?
The moral force of Bagem ihi's account, it seems, Iies not just in the
fact that animal homosexuality is a naturally occurring phenomenon, but
rather in the fact that biological diversity (of which it is a part) is beneficial and indeed necessary. Ultimately, then, the implicit moral argument
is a consequentialist one: biological diversity- including sexual variation , including among humans-i s good in that it contributes to a thriving
biosphere and hence has beneficial consequences for beings (including
human ones) within that biosphere . The themes evoked here are similar
to those of several other contemporary progressive movements, such as
those against genetically modified food and against some of the new
reproductive technologies. The common theme is that altering and interfering with nature in certain ways is morally wrong, not simply because
it is unnatural but because it is seriously harmful to human s and other animals (and, depending on one's theory of moral status, to the earth or biosphere itself). My suspicion is that, in many of the contexts in which
appea I to nature yields progressive conclusions, the true basis for those
conclusions is not any kind of updated natural law theory, but rather an
informed and enlightened consequential ism .
As a feminist, Pierce is concerned throughout with the implications
of various theoretical frameworks for women and other oppressed groups.
Her com ments on such matters are un iformly cogent. often shedd ing light
not just on the shortcomings of natural law theolY but also on the political necessity of rights theory and other foundations of En Iightenment liberalism. For instance, Chapter 6 ("Rights and Responsibilities") reminds
liS that rights talk is especially appropriate and necessary in relationships
of unequa I power and authority, where the more powerful party cannot
simply be assumed to be trustworthy or interested in fulfilling his responsibi Iities to the less powerful party. I.n Chapter 7 ("Postmodern ism and
Other Skepticisms"), Pierce offers a limited defense against claims that
fem inist ph ilosophy is or shoul.d be unequivocally al igned with postmoderniSIll. Particularly welcome is her clear explanation of the distinction
between universal explanatory theories (often, and rightly, criticized by
feminists as excessively totalizing and hence exclusionary) and universalization in ethics . The latter, as Pierce points out, "does not fail to tell
the stories of some because it tells no stories at a II."
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One of the book's most interesting claims is found in Chapter 2,
"Eros and Epistemology." In a single deft move, Pierce both defends
Plato against certain accusations of sexism and charges some of the critics themselves with heterosexism. In response to the claim that Platonic
metaphysics excludes women, Pierce contends that in fact, "platonic
metaphysics in its very nature excludes heterosexuals. Throughout the
Symposium and the Phaedrus, the eros that is required for the achievement of knowledge is homosexual." She thus denies that the eroticism
aiding our ascent to knowledge of the Forms has to be male, but she also
rejects the view that it could be any old eroticism at all. The latter view,
she notes, has sometimes been seen as "the on ly way" to let women back
into the picture; therein lies the heterosexism. It is unclear to me whether
Pierce believes that Plato was correct in claiming special epistemic
virtues for homosexual eroticism as such. Marilyn Frye's well-known
claim of such advantage for lesbians seems more plausible at first glance,
in that it trades on the political position of women and lesbians rather than
simply on the bodily "sameness" of the partners.

